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Abstract
The illusion of control refers to the inference of action-outcome contingency in situations where outcomes are in fact
random. The strength of this illusion has been found to be affected by whether the frequency of successes increases or
decreases over repeated trials, in what can be termed a “success-slope” effect. Previous studies have generated incon-
sistent findings regarding the nature of this effect. In this paper we present an experiment (N = 334) that overcomes
several methodological limitations within this literature, employing a wider range of dependent measures (measures
of two different types of illusory control, primary (by self) and secondary (by luck), as well as measures of remem-
bered success-frequency). Results indicate that different dependent measures lead to different effects. On measures of
(primary, but not secondary) control over the task, scores were highest when the rate of success increased over time.
Meanwhile, estimates of success-frequency in the task did not vary across conditions and showed trends consistent with
the broader literature on human memory.
Keywords: illusion of control, sequence of outcomes, success slope, primary and secondary control.
1 Introduction
Participants asked to determine the degree of contingency
between their press of a button and the onset of a light in-
crease their ratings with light onset frequency even when
the light is objectively uncontrollable (Alloy & Abram-
son, 1979; Jenkins & Ward, 1965). People place greater
value on lottery tickets they have personally chosen than
on tickets that have been handed out (Langer, 1975; Wohl
& Enzle, 2002). Slot-machine players choose machines
that have not paid out in some time and make use of ritu-
als and lucky charms (Henslin, 1967; Livingstone, Woo-
ley & Borrell, 2006; Wood & Clapham, 2005). All of
these phenomena are considered instances of the “illu-
sion of control”, the overestimation of contingency be-
tween personal actions (strategies) and task outcomes in
games of chance. The illusion is thought to be caused
by situational factors (e.g., the availability of a choice be-
tween action alternatives) in interaction with held beliefs
about these factors. In this sense, the illusion is an in-
ference based on situational information and prior beliefs
(Crocker, 1981; Harris & Osman, 2012). The illusion
expresses itself in repeated behaviours (e.g., strategic er-
rors, rituals) as well as explicit ratings of control over
real-world and laboratory gambling tasks.
Copyright: © 2013. The authors license this article under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
School of Psychology, University of Adelaide, North Tce., South
Australia, 5005. Email: anastasia.ejova@adelaide.edu.au
ySchool of Psychology, University of Adelaide
In light of the many potential real-world consequences
of illusory control inferences, a large number of labora-
tory studies have addressed their situational determinants
(for a review, see Thompson, Armstrong & Thomas,
1998). The studies typically involve a laboratory task
with objectively random outcomes, and the task tends
to be either familiar (e.g, roulette) or novel (e.g., a
button-and-light device). A single situational determi-
nant is manipulated and post-session estimates of con-
trol or success-frequency serve as the dependent measure.
The most frequently investigated situational determinants
have been success-frequency (e.g., Alloy & Abramson,
1979; Thompson et al., 2007) and opportunity for choice
and physical involvement (e.g., Ayeroff &Abelson, 1976;
Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005; Langer, 1975). Other iden-
tified determinants include need for the outcome (e.g.,
Biner, Huffman, Curran & Long, 1998; Gino, Sharek &
Moore, 2011) and the opportunity for practice (e.g., Be-
nassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979).
This paper aims to resolve conflicting findings regard-
ing another identified situational influence, namely the
“success-slope” (also known as “the sequence of out-
comes”; Langer & Roth, 1975). This term refers to
how successes and failures are positioned relative to each
other in a randomly-generated outcome sequence. A se-
quence with a descending success-slope begins with a
string of successes and concludes with a string of fail-
ures. In contrast, a sequence with an ascending slope is
characterised by a preponderance of successes at the end.
It is not difficult to propose theoretical reasons for why
these three conditions might lead to different judgments.
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For instance, it has been argued that in a “descending”
condition, people are motivated to see themselves as ef-
fective agents in the task, and so focus heavily on early
successes (Langer & Roth, 1975; Thompson, Armstrong
& Thomas, 1998). On the other hand, it has been sug-
gested that a run of late successes in the “ascending” con-
dition acts to strengthen control inferences by creating
the impression of learning (Matute, 1995). The difficulty,
however, lies in the fact that the empirical findings on this
effect are mixed.
To date, five experiments have examined ratings of
control and success-frequency following the experience
of 30 or so outcomes conforming to the “descending”,
“ascending”, or “flat” structures. Their findings regard-
ing the direction of the effect were not consistent. Four
studies concluded that inferred control is greatest in the
“descending” condition (Burger, 1986; Coventry & Nor-
man, 1998; Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1984; Langer &
Roth, 1975), but one study found that inferred control was
larger in the “ascending” condition (Matute, 1995).
When one looks at the literature a little more closely, a
number of difficulties present themselves. The first issue
is the potential conflation of the illusion of control with
memory effects; that is, the conflation of what is inferred
with what is remembered. This issue arises when par-
ticipants are asked to judge the number of successes that
they have had, and these judgments are used as a measure
of inferred control. To illustrate the problem, we note
that the conclusions of Langer and Roth (1975) are based
on observing that participants in the “descending” condi-
tion provided significantly higher estimates in response to
the following three questions: “Howmany correct predic-
tions did you have on the 30 trials?”, “How many correct
predictions do you think you would have had on the next
100 trials?” and “How good do you think you are at pre-
dicting outcomes like these?”. None of these questions
directly ask about the degree of control people perceive
themselves to have. Responses to these questions could
be influenced by factors other than one’s beliefs about
ability to control the outcome.
A second problem pertains to the issue of what it ac-
tually means to measure “inferred control”. Even when
inferred control is measured separately from estimated
success-frequency, the literature on the success-slope ef-
fect tends to treat inferred control as a unitary construct
that can be measured using a single question. As an ex-
ample, Burger (1986) relied on a single question asking
people to rate the “extent to which you believe that your
correct answers were the result of you ability to correctly
anticipate events”. There is some evidence to suggest
that the illusion of control is a more complicated phe-
nomenon. In a review of the illusion-of-control litera-
ture, Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) distinguished
between two different kinds of perceived control, “pri-
mary” and “secondary”. Primary control refers to the
belief that outcomes can be influenced through personal
skill. In contrast, secondary control refers to the belief
that external forces (e.g., luck, God) control the outcome,
but one can be aligned with these forces. A statement
like “I knew how to make my luck work for me” is a
good example of a belief in secondary control, insofar as
it implies that luck controls the outcome but is favour-
ing the speaker. In the broader cognitive science litera-
ture, a similar distinction has been drawn between beliefs
about physical entities and superstitious (or religious) be-
liefs about supernatural entities (e.g., Atran & Norenza-
yan, 2004; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). The illusion that
physical (i.e., skilled) actions are effective in a game of
chance would correspond to the illusion of primary con-
trol, while a belief in the effectiveness of superstitious or
religious rituals would correspond to the illusion of sec-
ondary control.
In view of the evidence that primary and secondary
control are distinct constructs, it seems sensible to mea-
sure inferred primary and secondary control separately.
To that end, we will follow a previous study (Ejova,
Delfabbro & Navarro, 2010) in adopting a factor-analytic
approach. That is, we will treat primary and secondary
control as latent variables, estimated by analysing a ques-
tionnaire that asks people to rate their agreement with a
number of statements, such as “I got better with prac-
tice”, “My skill in playing the game [helped me win]”,
“I’ve always been a lucky kind of person”, and “A certain
lucky way of playing just seemed to work for me”. Fac-
tor analysis of the responses is expected to reveal clusters
of “primary” and “secondary” statements (Ejova et al.,
2010). The factor scores recovered for individual partici-
pants can then be used as the measures of inferred control.
A third issue that we consider is the choice of control
conditions. As noted earlier, the success-slope literature
uses the “flat” condition as a control for the two condi-
tions that have success-slopes, namely the “descending”
condition and the “ascending” condition. Not all studies
have used all three conditions. In our study, we include
all three, and include an additional “U-shaped” condition,
in which there are clusters of wins at the beginning and at
the end. If early wins and late wins have distinct effects
on perceived control, this condition might be expected to
lead to the highest levels of perceived control. Even so,
the inclusion of this new condition is more exploratory
than hypothesis driven.
In sum, our study aims to test the direction of the
success-slope effect in a way that addresses and demon-
strates two methodological issues: the difference between
inferred control and remembered win frequency, and the
two-faceted nature of the illusion of control.
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Figure 1: Experimental task interface
2 Participants
There were 334 participants (171 males), ranging in age
from 18 to 80 (M = 25.0, SD = 11.0) and incorporat-
ing members of the general community alongside under-
graduate psychology students at the University of Ade-
laide. Recruitment was conducted through a newspa-
per advertisement, advertisements placed around campus,
and through a research participation website accessible
to undergraduate psychology students. As is standard
in studies of gambling, participation was conditional on
being over the age of 18, having gambled at a licensed
venue at least once previously, and not being in the pro-
cess of receiving treatment for gambling-related prob-
lems. Psychology students received course credit for par-
ticipating.
3 Materials, measures and proce-
dure
The experiment was a self-contained 30-minute comput-
erised exercise divided into four stages. These were: (1)
a pre-experimental questionnaire, (2) 48 trials of the ex-
perimental task, a “soccer-themed gambling task”, (3) the
post-experimental questionnaire, and then (4) additional
trials of the experimental task, if the participant so de-
sired1. The four different success-slope conditions (the
independent variable) corresponded to differences in the
sequence of outcomes experienced during the experimen-
tal task (stage 2), but in all other respects the conditions
were the same. The dependent measures and covariates
all derive from the two questionnaires. The description
below gives a broad overview of the study: additional de-
tails can be found in the Appendices (A and B).
3.1 The pre-experimental questionnaire
To maximise ecological validity, our experimental task
resembled a real-world gambling task. To accommodate
this, a pre-experimental questionnaire was used to mea-
sure participants’ beliefs about gambling. The obtained
scores were, in turn, used as covariates in analyses of
the relationship between success-slope and inferred con-
trol and between success-slope and remembered success-
frequency. Similarly, because the surface form of the task
was based on soccer, the pre-experimental questionnaire
also measured interest in soccer, which then served as a
covariate in the major analyses.
The measures used were as follows. For beliefs about
gambling, we used the Drake Beliefs About Chance In-
ventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham 2005), a 22-item ques-
tionnaire that is organised into two scales, one relating
to superstitious beliefs (DBC-Secondary) and the other to
more conventional erroneous beliefs about chance events
(DBC-Primary; see Appendix A.1). To measure interest
in soccer, we asked people to rate their interest on a five-
point Likert scale (see Appendix A.1).
3.2 The experimental manipulation
The independent variable, success-slope, was manipu-
lated across four between-subjects conditions. In the “de-
scending” condition (N = 85), early wins were followed
by a string of losses. For the “ascending” condition (N =
79), the opposite was the case, and in the “flat” condition
(N = 84), wins were approximately evenly distributed
across the playing session. The “U-shaped” condition (N
= 86) featured a concentration of wins at the beginning
1The total number of rounds played was recorded as part of a broader
investigation into behavioural and questionnaire-based measures of the
illusion of control.
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and at the end. In all conditions, participants experienced
a win on 8 of the 48 trials.
3.3 The soccer-themed gambling task
The experimental task was a soccer-themed computerised
task modelled after a slot machine in several respects:
the option to bet on the results of multiple trials corre-
sponded to the option to vary the number of lines played
on a slot machine; there were more near misses than far
misses; sound effects corresponded to those heard on slot
machines; and bet and win-amounts for each betting op-
tion were calibrated to result in a long-term loss of 10%
of used money, the return rate on South Australian slot
machines.
The task instructions, issued verbally and in writing at
the start of the session, emphasised that the task operated
on the same principles as real slot machines, and that any
credits won during the game would be exchanged for cash
at the end. Participants played the game for a compulsory
48 trials, with any additional rounds being voluntary. Par-
ticipants began the task with 5000 credits, which, they
were informed, was equivalent to $AUD5.
An overview of the experimental task is shown in Fig-
ure 1. Each trial of the task displayed an on-screen soccer
player taking a free kick, and participants were required
to bet on the player scoring a goal. Several betting options
were available, including some options that involved bet-
ting on the results of multiple trials (e.g., that the player
would score three times in a row; Screen 2 in the figure).
Other choices were also required. First, at the start of the
game, participants were required to choose from among
four different real-world players, each of whom had an
entertaining biography provided (Screen 1). A change of
player profile could be made after any round. Also, on
each trial, participants chose which of the four corners
of the goal the player kicked towards, a “random” option
also being available (Screen 3). None of these choices in-
fluenced the outcome sequence, which was fixed for the
first 48 trials in all four experimental conditions.
The outcome itself was displayed as an animation
showing a goal being scored or a miss (Screen 4). The
ball was shown to move in the direction that the partici-
pant selected, with a random number generator determin-
ing, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether or not the outcome
was shown to be “close”. For example, for misses, the
randomly-generated number determined whether the shot
was shown to be a near-miss caught by the goalkeeper, or
a far miss well clear of the goal posts.
The animation was followed by confirmation of the
outcome, sounds of applause in the event of a goal, and
adjustment of the credit count (Screen 5). Credits were
subtracted in each round, and added whenever a goal or
multiple goals were scored in line with the chosen betting
Table 1: The main measure of inferred control in the post-
experimental questionnaire (Ejova, Delfabbro &Navarro,
2010).
When thinking about your wins/goals, to what extent
would you use each of the following statements to
describe how they came about? Rate each of the
statements using a number from 0 to 10. As a guide,
give a rating of 0 if you think that the phenomenon
described by the statement was not one of the reasons,
a rating of 5 if you think the phenomenon was a
moderately important reason, and a rating of 10 if you
think that the phenomenon was one of the most
important reasons.
1. I got better with practice.
2. I learned how to predict the movements of the
goalkeeper.
3. My skill in playing the game
4. Experience at playing computer games
5. The kick directions I chose 
6. My knowledge of soccer
7. I developed a logical strategy for playing the
game.
8. The player(s) I chose
9. The bet options I chose 
10. I deserved to win.
11. I’ve always been a lucky kind of person.
12. A certain lucky way of playing just seemed to
work for me.
13. I took advantage of moments when my luck was
good.
14. I knew how to make luck go my way.
15. It was all chance.
Statement order was randomised for each participant.
 Statements added to the set used by Ejova, Navarro
and Delfabbro (2010).
option.
3.4 The post-experimental questionnaire
After participants completed the experimental task, we
administered a questionnaire designed to elicit their con-
clusions about the task. It is from this questionnaire that
our dependent measures were constructed.
To measure perceived control, we presented partici-
pants with the 15 items outlined in Table 1, and used fac-
tor analysis to reduce these 15 manifest variables to two
latent variables, which (as outlined in the Results) loosely
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correspond to illusory primary and secondary control.
These two variables formed our dependent measures for
the two kinds of illusory control.
The other dependent measures related to success-
frequency. The retrospective success-frequency item
asked people to state the percentage of shots that resulted
in goals, whereas the prospective success-frequency item
framed the question in terms of the percentage of suc-
cesses the participant would expect to see if the task were
continued (see Appendix A.3). For the retrospective item,
the question was framed in terms of number of wins for
half the participants, and in terms of the number of losses
for the other half (for data analysis, we converted all re-
sponses to the “wins” format by subtracting responses in
the loss frame from 100).
The final component of the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire was a manipulation check item, intended sim-
ply to verify that participants noticed the success-slope
to which they were exposed. Responses to this question
confirmed that the manipulation was successful, espe-
cially in the “descending” condition, where 78% of par-
ticipants indicated that “noticeably more wins occurred at
the beginning” (see Appendix A.4 for more details).
3.5 Additional methodological details
Three additional methodological details are worth not-
ing. Firstly, we wished to check that participants under-
stood the instruction that the task was a gambling game
rather than a solvable video game. To this end, the post-
experimental questionnaire contained a yes/no question
about whether a strategy was used. Those answering af-
firmatively were asked to describe the strategy. Partici-
pants, on the whole, could be concluded to have under-
stood the instruction if some of the described strategies
reflected reasoning typically observed in the face of ran-
dom outcomes—gambler’s-fallacy-type reasoning (e.g.,
increasing bet amounts after a number of losses in expec-
tation of an imminent win; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
As a listing of the strategies in Appendix C shows, a sub-
stantial number of described strategies appeared to be in-
formed by the gambler’s fallacy.
Secondly, to conceal the purpose of the experiment
from participants, the pre- and post-experimental ques-
tionnaires contained distractor items in addition to the
theoretically interesting ones mentioned earlier. A mood
questionnaire (Lorr & Wunderlich, 1988) was included
in both the pre- and post-experimental questionnaires,
and the post-experimental questionnaire required Likert
or 10-point-scale-based ratings of enjoyment of the game,
strength of experienced emotional responses, and the ex-
tent to which the player profile feature and sound effects
added to or reduced enjoyment. For the sake of brevity,
we do not describe or analyse these items.
Finally, debriefing focused on explaining that none of
the task’s choice features (player profiles, kick directions,
betting timing) influenced outcomes. We also took care to
check whether our participants were at risk of experienc-
ing gambling problems. To that end, the pre-experimental
questionnaire also included the ProblemGambling Sever-
ity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). If a participant’s re-
sponses indicated that a risk of problem gambling ex-
isted, this was surreptitiously communicated to the exper-
imenter via the colour of the on-screen message display-
ing the cash-out amount to be paid to the participant. De-
briefing for these participants additionally involved pro-
viding them with an information sheet with help-service
contact numbers.
4 Results
4.1 Estimating inferred control
As noted in the previous section, we used a 15-item ques-
tion (Table 1) to assess participants’ inferences about
control, and used factor analysis to reduce responses to
two theoretically interpretable latent variables. Ejova,
Navarro and Delfabbro’s (2010) procedure for doing this
was followed, with the items first being screened for suffi-
cient variability and intercorrelation. Given that this anal-
ysis was complex and is not the central topic of investiga-
tion, details are relegated to Appendix D, and only a brief
overview is provided here. Two items (9 and 15) were
removed from the analysis because their correlations did
not appear robust. The remaining 13 items loaded natu-
rally onto two factors. The first factor consists of items
1-8, and can be interpreted as primary control, insofar as
it consists of statements that refer to strategies and game
features. Items 10–14 form a factor that resembles sec-
ondary control, inasmuch as it is defined by statements
referring to luck and its sensitivity to deservingness. The
factors were highly correlated2.
In addition to estimating the factor loadings of each
item on the two latent variables, we calculated the fac-
tor scores for each participant. These scores correspond
to the score that each participant is estimated to have on
the latent variables. Specifically, because our two latent
variables were correlated, we computed regression factor
scores, an aggregate score suitable for describing an indi-
vidual’s position on correlated factors (DiStefano, Zhu &
Mîndrila˘, 2009).
2This is to be expected, given that numerous researchers have re-
marked that, in gambling contexts, beliefs in personal skill at predicting
chance outcomes and some beliefs about luck (namely, the common be-
lief that good luck comes in “cycles”) might have the gambler’s fallacy
as a common source (Keren &Wagenaar, 1985; Livingstone, Wooley &
Borrell, 2006).
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Figure 2: Estimated means (and 95% CIs) of inferred pri-
mary control across success-slope conditions when co-
variates were evaluated at their mean values.


































For the purposes of subsequent analyses, note that the
regression factor scores standardised to a mean of zero, so
negative factor scores indicated lower ratings on the state-
ments associated with the factor, while positive scores
indicated greater endorsement (greater inferred control).
The distributions of both primary and secondary control
factor scores were highly positively skewed (skew = .73
and .67, respectively), and had standard deviations of .96
and .92, respectively. It is these factor score variables
that we use as our measures of perceived control in sub-
sequent analyses.
4.2 Inferred control across success-slopes
To test the direction of the success-slope effect, scores on
the two perceived control measures produced by the fac-
tor analysis were examined across success-slope condi-
tions. This involved analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs)
with success-slope condition as the predictor and two co-
variates: soccer interest and slot-machine beliefs as mea-
sured by the DBC. The “Primary” scale of the DBC, re-
lating to non-superstitious beliefs about chance, was the
covariate in the analysis of the perceived primary con-
trol measure. Correspondingly, the DBC’s “Secondary”
scale, concerned with superstitious and supernatural be-
liefs, was the covariate in the analysis of perceived sec-
ondary control3.
The degree of perceived primary control was found to
vary as a function of success-slope (F(3,328) = 1.95, p =
.03 p2 = .03) once the substantial effect of slot-machine
3All three covariates were checked for homogeneity of variance
across experimental conditions using univariate analysis of variance (all
F(3,330) < 1). DBC-Total, used as a covariate in some later analyses,
was also homogenous across conditions (F(3,330) < 1).
beliefs (DBC-Primary) was controlled for (F(1,328) =
120.21, p < .001, p2 = .27)4. Figure 2 shows the es-
timated means for primary control when DBC-Primary
was set to a constant (mean) value5. As the distribution of
means suggests, and as was confirmed by post-hoc tests
with Bonferroni adjustment of the familywise -level to
.05, the estimated primary control mean was greater in the
“ascending” condition relative to the “descending” condi-
tion (p = .04).
Perceived secondary control was not affected by
success-slope, but was predicted by slot-machine beliefs
(F(1,328) = 114.63, p < .001, p2 = .26). Thus, the cru-
cial result pertained to perceived primary control, with
the “ascending” condition producing stronger inferences
than the “descending” condition.
To formally test the widespread methodological as-
sumption that estimated success-frequency is a suitable
proxy for control, success-frequency estimates (retro-
spective and prospective) were examined for their pattern
across success-slope conditions. This pattern could then
be compared to that observed for inferred primary con-
trol.
Since success-frequency estimates on both measures
were not normally distributed (as is typical with count
data), the analysis of responses to each measure across
success-slope conditions involved fitting a generalised
linear model with an assumed negative binomial distri-
bution and log link function. Gambling-related beliefs
(DBC-Total) and soccer interest served as covariates in
both analyses, and the analysis of retrospective frequency
estimates had question framing (frequency of “goals” vs
frequency of “misses”) as an additional predictor. The
analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 19.
Estimates of retrospective success-frequency were
found to be influenced by question framing (Wald 2(1) =
21.32, p < .001) but not success-slope (Wald 2(3) = 5.23,
p = .16) or the interaction between framing and success-
slope (Wald 2(3) = 6.82, p = .08). Table 2 shows the
estimates across success-slope conditions, broken down
according to question frame. It can be seen that, across
all conditions, estimates were higher when the question
referred to “misses”. As far as the effect of success-slope
itself is concerned, the table shows that there was a trend
towards higher estimates in the “descending” condition
relative to the “ascending” condition. This trend is in
4Since the distribution of perceived primary control scores was
highly skewed, a generalised linear model suitable for ordinal data was
also fitted. The independent variable and covariates were the same as
for the ANCOVA, but the model assumed a multinomial distribution
and used a cumulative logit link function. The effect of success-slope
was found to be marginally significant (Wald 2(3) = 7.35, p = .06).
5The marginal means for perceived primary control across exper-
imental conditions were as follows. Descending: M = -.2, SD = .8;
U-shaped: M = .04, SD = 1.0; Ascending: M = .2, SD = 1.1; Flat: M =
.02, SD = 1.0.
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Table 2: Mean remembered success-frequency estimates across success-slope conditions.










































 CI contains only values above the objective baseline success-frequency (16.7%), suggesting general
overestimation.
Figure 3: Estimated means (and 95% CIs) of retrospec-
tive success-frequency estimates across success-slope
conditions when covariates were evaluated at their mean
values.





























the opposite direction to that observed for inferred con-
trol ratings. To highlight this contrast, Figure 3 comple-
ments Figure 2 in showing mean retrospective success-
frequency estimates across conditions, adjusted for co-
variates.
Estimates of prospective success-frequency also did
not differ significantly across experimental conditions
(Wald 2(3) = 1.31, p = .72), but showed the same general
trend of higher estimates in the “descending” condition.
The means of the prospective estimates across conditions
are shown in Table 2.
Success-frequency estimates showed additional no-
table regularities across conditions, as can be seen in Ta-
ble 2. Namely, answers to the retrospective question in
the “miss” framing were largely overestimations of the
objective success-frequency (1/6 = 16.7%). A further reg-
ularity was a general tendency towards overestimation in
the “descending” and “flat” conditions.
5 Discussion
5.1 The success-slope effect
The main goal of this study was to determine which
success-slopes produce stronger post-experimental infer-
ences of illusory control. The results suggested that per-
ceived primary control is largest in the “ascending” con-
dition and lowest in the “descending” condition, with the
“flat” and “U-shaped” conditions lying in the middle.
The fact that the “ascending” condition produced the
strongest inferences of control is broadly consistent with
Matute’s (1995) proposal that experiencing an increasing
rate of successes can create the false impression of learn-
ing the correct strategy. The findings can alternatively
be interpreted as evidence that experiencing a decreas-
ing win rate in the “descending” condition leads to an
accurate perception that no learning is occurring. Specif-
ically, the “descending” condition might provide partici-
pants with a strong signal that whatever strategy they are
attempting to employ does not work. After all, the partici-
pant is presumably trying to produce the successes, but in
the “descending” condition the rate of such successes de-
clines over time, making it very clear that these attempts
have been unsuccessful.
5.2 Primary and secondary control
A second goal of the study was to employ more refined
measures of the extent to which people perceived them-
selves to be in control of the outcome. In this respect, the
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outcomes are a little more mixed. On the positive side,
the factor analysis did suggest that there are two distinct
(but correlated) kinds of beliefs about control involved,
consistent with Rothbaum et al. (1982) and Ejova et al.
(2010). Moreover, it is reassuring to see that our mea-
sure of primary control within a complicated and realis-
tic task produced a success-slope effect consistent with
the results of a previous study that used a simpler design
(Matute, 1995). These results suggest that the success-
slope effect is not an artefact of a particular way in which
questions about perceived control are worded, nor is it
restricted to simplistic experimental designs.
On the negative side, part of our motivation for using
richer measures of perceived control in the context of a
rich and complicated task was to see if we could detect
any interesting effects for secondary control. As noted in
the Introduction, in real world gambling situations, peo-
ple do make claims about secondary control. People often
refer to “luck” as an entity that can be on the gambler’s
side, for instance (e.g., Keren & Wagenaar 1985). This is
partly reflected in our results, to the extent that the degree
of secondary control that participants reported in our task
did correlate with their score on the relevant scale of the
Drake Beliefs about Chance questionnaire. However, we
did not uncover any evidence for a success-slope effect
with respect to secondary control.
5.3 Memory versus inferred control
One of our major concerns outlined in the Introduction
was the possibility that asking people what they remem-
ber about outcome frequency is not a good substitute for
asking them about the amount of control they perceived
over that outcome. This concern was borne out, in that,
unlike ratings of inferred control, estimates of remem-
bered success-frequency were found not to be affected
by success-slope. Moreover, the success-frequency es-
timates displayed trends consistent with those observed
in the memory literature. For instance, studies of mem-
ory point to a “spacing effect”—consistently better mem-
ory for stimuli more distributed across time (e.g., Glen-
berg, Bradley, Kraus & Renzaglia, 1983; Varey, Mellers
& Birnbaum, 1990). The fact that we observed higher
estimates in response to the “miss” framing of the retro-
spective success-frequency question (“What percentage
of the shots you kicked over the course of the game re-
sulted in misses?”) is consistent with this effect. Specif-
ically, misses might have been remembered more poorly
than goals because they were less widely spaced, with
reverse-scoring of responses, therefore, producing over-
estimations.
Similarly, what has been termed an “over-under ef-
fect” might have been operating in all conditions, mani-
festing itself in overestimation rather than accurate recall
in the “descending” and “flat” conditions, and in accu-
racy rather than underestimation in the other two condi-
tions. The effect refers to the tendency to overestimate
low event frequencies and underestimate high ones (e.g.,
Begg, 1974; Erlick, 1964; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994;
Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Background beliefs about the
task determine what constitutes “low” and “high” fre-
quencies (Lichtenstein et al., 1978), so, given partici-
pants’ beliefs about gambling and soccer, it is possible
that the success-frequency of 1/6 was low in the context
of the soccer task. The resultant upwards-adjustment of
estimates in all conditions could have produced the ob-
served pattern in the following ways. In the “flat” con-
dition, the “spacing effect” could have produced accurate
estimates, which were adjusted upwards to result in the
observed overestimation. In the “descending” condition,
the well-known “primacy effect”, involving better mem-
ory for items and events at the beginning of a sequence
(e.g., Murdock, 1962), could have resulted in accurate
estimates, which were then adjusted upwards to produce
the observed overestimation. In the “U-shaped” condi-
tion, the “primacy effect” would have been weaker be-
cause there were fewer target items (successes) to remem-
ber at the beginning of the sequence. Likewise, in the
“ascending” condition, there were no target items at the
beginning of the sequence, so a “primacy effect” could
not occur. Thus, in these conditions, memory for suc-
cesses might have been poorer but estimates might have
been adjusted upwards as part of the “over-under effect”,
resulting in the observed accuracy.
A “recency effect”, involving better memory for the
last items in a sequence, has also been widely docu-
mented and might have been expected to manifest it-
self in higher estimates in the “U-shaped” and “ascend-
ing” conditions. However, the “recency effect” is easily
disrupted by interference tasks (e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz,
1966), which, in this experiment, occurred between the
end of the experimental session and the time when the
success-frequency question was answered.
Of course, these memory-based explanations for the
success-frequency findings are only speculative and re-
quire formal testing. However, the extent to which our re-
sults appear to agree with the memory literature does sug-
gest that success-frequency estimates in illusion of con-
trol studies have, to date, reflected memory of the number
of obtained wins rather than inferences about how wins
can be obtained.
5.4 Directions for future research
One direction for future research could involve testing
competing explanations for our main result—the find-
ing that the “ascending” condition had higher associated
inferred control levels than the “descending” condition.
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Matute (1995) obtained a similar finding and interpreted
it to mean that participants in the “ascending” condition
believed that they had learned the “correct” response. An
alternative interpretation is that experiencing a declining
success rate in the “descending” condition caused partic-
ipants to accurately perceive that no learning was occur-
ring. Testing Matute’s explanation would involve observ-
ing behavioural patterns over time, as Matute did in find-
ing that participants in the “ascending” condition were
more likely to repeat the same response or response se-
quence during the last trials of the task. Analogously, in
our experimental task, if Matute’s interpretation is cor-
rect, the “ascending” condition should give rise to de-
clining rates of player-profile change and kick-direction
variability over time.
Our findings also raise questions regarding the illusion
of secondary control. One issue is that the fine details of
the factor analysis used to establish the illusion of sec-
ondary control as a separate construct differed slightly
from those in the study by Ejova et al. (2010; see Ap-
pendix C). The task for future research is to adjust the
wording of the perceived-control measure to form a mea-
sure of inferred primary and secondary control that can be
applied consistently across studies. Since the illusion of
secondary control was found not to vary as a function of
success-slope, another task for future research is to iden-
tify other factors that might influence this variant of the
illusion. The degree of choice available in the gambling
task has been suggested as a possibility. Specifically, it
has been suggested that greater opportunities for choice
allow for a wider range of magical or superstitious beliefs
to be applied in generating playing strategies (Rothbaum,
Weisz & Snyder, 1982; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). For exam-
ple, in our experimental task, the availability of a player
profile choice option featuring famous soccer players al-
lowed participants to select a “lucky” player. Removing
this feature or using less well-known players should, by
this logic, lead to a reduction in perceived secondary con-
trol.
Future research could also set out to test our specu-
lative claims about the memory effects underlying the
observed pattern of success-frequency estimates across
success-slope conditions. Specifically, one hypothesis
was that an “over-under effect” (the tendency to over-
estimate the baseline success-frequency because it was
only 1/6) operated in all conditions. This claim could be
verified by obtaining success-frequency estimates across
different objective success frequencies within the soccer-
themed task and observing (a) whether lower frequencies
are consistently overestimated while higher frequencies
are consistently underestimated, and (b) whether 1/6 is
among the “lower” (i.e., overestimated) frequencies. A
second claim was that “recency effects” (better mem-
ory for events late in the sequence) disappeared in the
“ascending” condition due to the time that elapsed be-
tween the end of the task and the presentation of success-
frequency questions. This hypothesis can be tested by in-
vestigating whether the “ascending” condition produces
higher success-frequency estimates when questioning is
immediate rather than delayed.
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Appendix A: Measures and proce-
dure
A.1: Pre-experimental questionnaire
Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood
& Clapham, 1995)
Illusion of Control scale (DBC-Primary)
1. Wins are more likely to occur on a hot machine.
2. The more familiar I am with a slot machine game,
the more likely I am to win.
3. It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice
on a winning streak.
4. Show me a gambler with a well-planned system and
I’ll show you a winner.
5. If a coin is tossed and comes up heads ten times in a
row, the next toss is more likely to be tails.
6. There are secrets to successful slot machine, roulette
and dice gambling that can be learned.
7. One should pay attention to lottery numbers that of-
ten win.
8. A good slot machine, roulette or dice gambler is like
a sportsperson who knows winning plays and how
to use them.
9. Some gamblers are just born lucky.
10. The longer I’ve been losing, the more likely I am to
win.
11. I will be more successful if I have a system to play
the slot machines.
Superstition scale (DBC-Secondary)
1. There may be magic in certain numbers.
2. I can improve my chances of winning by performing
certain special rituals
3. There is useful information in my daily horoscope.
4. Playing slot machines is a form of competition be-
tween the player and the machine.
5. I believe that fate is against me when I lose.
6. A game of chance is a contest of wills between the
game and the player.
7. When I take a test (or took them in the past) I use a
lucky pen or pencil.
8. When I need a little luck I wear lucky clothes or jew-
ellery.
9. I consider myself to be a superstitious person.
10. I like to carry a coin, charm or token when I’m doing
something important.
11. I have a special system for picking lottery numbers.
Soccer Interest
To what extent are you interested in soccer? (0) Very
strongly, (1) Strongly, (2) Mildly, (3) Very little, (4) Not
at all
A.2: Task instructions
Verbal and written instructions issued to participants
upon arrival
There has been some speculation about the na-
ture of psychological responses to themed gam-
bling tasks, such as slot machine games based
on well-known board games or sports. This
study is concerned with your impressions of a
soccer-themed gambling task we have designed
for use in future research on this issue. The task
operates on exactly the same principles as a slot
machine, but looks slightly different because it
has been adapted for the university laboratory,
a setting that lacks the lights, sounds, and social
atmosphere of real gambling venues.
Participation in the experiment will involve
completing a preliminary questionnaire about
your gambling-related and soccer-related ex-
periences, playing the computerised soccer-
themed gambling game, and completing a
questionnaire about your impressions of the
gambling task.
On-screen instructions presented after completion of
the pre-experimental questionnaire
You are now ready to play the soccer-themed
gambling game itself! The game possesses the
essential features of a slot machine game, but
these features are embedded in a gaming en-
vironment that is thematically more interesting
than standard slot machine games.
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Here are the basic rules of the game... You will
start the game with $5 worth of credit. In each
round, you will be able to choose how much
credit to bet on whether a goal (or a set of goals)
will be scored by a soccer player shown on the
screen. Apart from the bet amount, you will
also be asked to choose a player profile and the
direction in which the ball will be kicked.
A.3: Post-experimental questionnaire
Inferred control
Supplementary yes/no strategy measure:
Did your experience of the game suggest to you
that you could draw on a strategy to produce
goals when you needed them?
If yes, briefly describe your strategy.
Remembered success-frequency
Retrospective goals (for a random half of participants)
As far as you can remember, what percentage
of the shots you kicked over the course of the
game resulted in goals?
Retrospective misses (for a random half of partici-
pants)
As far as you can remember, what percentage
of the shots you kicked over the course of the
game resulted in misses?
Prospective
If you were allowed to kick another 100 shots
in the game, on how many of those shots do
you think you would score a goal?
A.4: Post-experimental questionnaire: ma-
nipulation check
Item
As far as you can remember, what is the best way to de-
scribe the overall sequence of kick outcomes you experi-
enced during the game?
• Wins were relatively evenly spaced out across
rounds;
• Noticeably more wins occurred at the beginning;
• Noticeably more wins occurred during the middle
rounds;
• Noticeably more wins occurred at the end;
• Noticeably more wins occurred at the beginning
AND at the end.
• Other (please specify)
Findings
In the “descending” condition, the correct answer of “No-
ticeably more wins occurred at the beginning” was of-
fered by 78% of participants. In the “ascending” con-
dition, 55% reported experiencing most wins at the end,
and 24% in the middle rounds. Among participants in
the “flat” condition, 42% correctly recalled that “wins
were relatively evenly spaced across rounds” and 25 %
reported the wins to have been concentrated in the mid-
dle rounds. In the “U-shaped” condition, 47% reported
seeing most wins in the beginning, 26% reported an even
spread, and 15% correctly identified their sequence as
having featured “more wins at the beginning AND at the
end”.
Appendix B: The experimental ma-
nipulation
Participants experienced one of three possible outcome
sequences in each success-slope condition. In generating
the “descending” sequences, it was decided that the four
12-trial blocks comprising 48 trials would feature four,
three, one, and zero wins, respectively. Numbers from
one to 12 were then randomly generated without replace-
ment to determine the exact position of the winning trials.
Three different sequences were created in this way and
Table B.1 shows one of them.
The “flat” and “U-shaped” sequences were created in
a similar manner, subject to the constraint that “flat” se-
quences would be characterised by two wins per 12-trial
block, while the “U-shaped” sequences would feature
three wins in the first and last blocks, and one in each of
the middle blocks. The “ascending” sequences were ob-
tained, simply, by flipping the “descending” sequences.
Table B.1. An example of the outcome sequences experi-
enced in the four success-slope conditions.
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Appendix C: Factor analysis and pre-
liminary screening of inferred control
measure
Before submitting responses on the inferred control mea-
sure (“To what extent would you use each of the fol-
lowing statements to describe the reason for your suc-
cesses?”) to a factor analysis, two preparatory steps were
taken. First, responses were checked for sufficient vari-
ability, as reflected in the frequency of non-zero ratings.
The distribution of responses is summarised in Table C.1
and is almost identical to that obtained in our earlier study
(Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2010). On average, ap-
proximately 60 percent of the ratings provided for each
statement were not zero. The newly-introduced “Bet op-
tions” statement (9) was distinct in attracting non-zero
ratings from 80 percent of participants.
The second preparatory step, also conducted in the pi-
lot study, was a screening procedure aimed at identifying
statements correlating with other statements due solely
to inter-correlating zero ratings. The procedure is as fol-
lows. Starting with the statement that attracted the most
zero ratings, select only those participants who did not
provide a zero rating for that statement. If, in this se-
lect dataset, the Spearman correlations of the statement
with other statements become largely non-significant, ex-
clude the statement from the subsequent factor analysis.
The application of this procedure led to the exclusion of
the “Chance” statement (15). While non-zero ratings on
other statements correlated with ratings on a minimum of
four statements (p < .01), non-zero ratings on this state-
ment did not correlate with any statement ratings.
For the 14 retained statements, an examination of ini-
tial communalities led to the further exclusion of the
“Bet” statement (9) from the factor analysis. For the
remaining statements, a Principal Axis Factoring (PAF)
analysis was carried out upon ascertaining factorability
(KMO = .94; Bartlett’s test: 2 (78) = 2130.11, p < .001;
initial communalities shown in Table C.2.). Various cri-
teria for extracting factors (eigenvalues greater than one,
point of inflection on the scree plot and parallel analy-
sis6) suggested a two-factor solution (Hayton, Allen &
Scarpello, 2004), so two factors were extracted.
The factor loadings of statements following direct
oblimin rotation (Costello & Osborne, 2005) are shown
in Table C.2. In line with the pilot findings, statements
relating to practice (1), skill (3), computer games (4),
and strategy (7) clustered together in loading on a pri-
mary control factor (Factor 1). This factor also came to
be defined by the “Goalkeeper” (2) and “Player profile”
(8) statements, which had loaded on secondary control
in Ejova et al. (2010). The newly-introduced statement
about kick direction choices (5) also loaded on this fac-
tor, and the final statement comprising the factor was the
“Soccer knowledge” statement (5), which was excluded
from Ejova et al.’s (2010) factor analysis because it at-
tracted the highest number of zero ratings. Factor 2 cor-
responded to an inferred secondary control latent variable
in consisting of the four luck-related statements (11–14)
and the “Deserving to win” statement (10). The two fac-
tors were strongly correlated (r = .73).
6The parallel analysis was carried out using the nFactors package
(Raiche & Magis, 2010) in R Version 2.15.0. IBM SPSS Statistics 19.0
was used for all other analyses.
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Table C.1. Distribution of responses to statements comprising the inferred control measure (N = 334).










1. I got better with practice. 156 84 44 50
2. I learned how to predict the movements of the goalkeeper. 176 103 22 33
3. My skill in playing the game 145 117 35 37
4. Experience at playing computer games 150 87 43 54
5. The kick directions I chose 91 93 58 92
6. My knowledge of soccer 189 90 27 28
7. I developed a logical strategy for playing the game. 114 96 46 78
8. The player(s) I chose 115 93 52 74
9. The bet options I chose 66 74 78 116
10. I deserved to win. 157 75 39 63
11. I’ve always been a lucky kind of person. 141 104 52 37
12. A certain lucky way of playing just seemed to work for me. 130 113 45 46
13. I took advantage of moments when my luck was good. 131 87 30 86
14. I knew how to make luck go my way. 186 98 25 25









# 21 of these Ss provided zero ratings on all other statements.
Table C.2. For the 13 retained statements of the inferred control measure, initial communalities and factor loadings









1. Practice .66 .99 .74
2. Goalkeeper movements .55 .78 .57
3. Skill .65 .72 .66
4. Computer games .52 .68 .54
5. Kick direction .37 .60 .37
6. Soccer knowledge .40 .57 .39
7. Strategy .40 .55 .37
8. Player profiles .36 .53 .34
10. Deserving to win .47 .84 .60
11. Self as lucky person .44 .69 .50
12. Lucky play pattern .49 .63 .54
13. Lucky moments .45 .58 .49
14. Knowledge of luck .56 .40 .41 .57
Variance accounted for after rotation: 46% 5%
Cronbach’s alpha: .88 .84
Note: Factor loadings <.3 are suppressed.
